Over the past decade bilinear maps have been used to build a large variety of cryptosystems. In addition to new functionality, we have concurrently seen the emergence of many strong assumptions. In this work, we explore how to build bilinear map cryptosystems under progressively weaker assumptions.
Introduction
Since the introduction of the Boneh-Franklin [BF03] Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) system a decade ago, we have seen an explosion of new cryptosystems based on bilinear maps. These systems have provided a wide range of functionality including: new signature systems, functional encryption, ecash, "slightly" homomorphic encryption, broadcast encryption and oblivious transfer to name just a few. The focus of many of this work was to develop new (and often not realized before) functionality. While Boneh-Franklin and many first IBE systems used "core" assumptions such as the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman or decisional variants, over time there has been a trend in bilinear map based work to employ stronger assumptions in order to obtain these functionalities. Examples of these assumptions range from "q-type" [Gen06] assumptions, assumptions in composite order groups [BGN05], interactive assumptions [AP05] and proofs that appealed directly on the generic group model [BB04b, Boy08] Interestingly, even some work that focused on tightening security (versus achieving new functionality) have had to employ relatively strong assumptions. For example, Gentry and Halevi [GH09] and Waters [Wat09] proposed two different approaches for solving the problem of achieving adaptive security for Hierarchical Identity-Based encryption. To achieve this the former used a q-type assumption where the strength of the assumption depends on the number of attacker private key queries. The latter used the decisional-Linear assumption, where the target of the assumption is in the source element of the bilinear group versus the target element. Both of these assumptions are potentially stronger than the classic decisional-BDH prior IBE and related systems were built upon.
Our Goals. In this work, we move in the opposite direction of this trend. We will build bilinear map systems that depend on weaker assumptions than the decisional-BDH assumption. In particular, we want to create a suitable family of assumptions that becomes progressively weaker as some parameter k is increased. Therefore one can increase k as a hedge against potential future attacks such as an n-linear map for n > 2.
A natural starting point for our investigation is the k-Linear family of assumptions [HK07, Sha07], which generalizes the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDH) and the decisional Linear assumption of Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham [BBS04]. For k ≥ 1, a k-Linear problem instance is a tuple (g, g 1 , . . . , g k , g r 1 1 , . . . , g r k k , T ), where the generators are random in the group G, the exponents in its support Z p , and the goal is to determine whether T is equal to g r 1 +···+r k or random. DDH is 1-Linear, and the Linear assumption is 2-Linear.
The k-Linear assumption family has been successfully used to build chosen ciphertext secure encryption [HK07, Sha07]; to construct pseudorandom functions [LW09, BMR10]; to construct public-key encryption secure in the presence of encryption cycles [BHHO08, CCS09] and public-key encryption resilient to key leakage [NS09, DHLAW10] ; to construct lossy trapdoor functions [FGK + 10]; to construct leakage-resilient signatures [BSW11] .
While the k-Linear family has been successful in the above contexts, we desire an assumption that can be used in bilinear map cryptosystems in place of where DBDH has typically been applied. Here using the k-Linear family does not appear well suited for two reasons. First, since the assumption of the family operates solely in the source group, the assumption is not even "aware" of bilinear groups. Therefore it is not clear how it might be applied in certain systems (e.g. an variant of Boneh-Boyen IBE) where we are hiding a message in the target group. Second, the Linear assumption family has an inconsistent interaction with the DBDH assumption: the 1, 2-Linear assumptions are actually stronger than DBDH, but the the k-Linear assumptions for k > 2 are generically incomparable to DBDH. One reason that the (2-)Linear assumption has proved so useful is that it gives DBDH "for free," but this is lost as soon as one increases k beyond 2. If a new IBE system were based on k-Linear and DBDH, it is not clear that this would provide an improvement in security. 1 Our goals, then, are to find an assumption family that meets the following criteria:
• As we increase the assumption family parameter k, we should become more confident in the security of our assumption. In particular, we would argue that our k parameterized assumption is in some sense more secure than both existing decisional assumptions in bilinear groups and more secure than the k − 1 instance.
• Our family of assumptions should be amenable to building cryptographic systems. Ideally, for any system built using the DBDH assumption, one could find a variant built using our family.
The k-BDH Family of Assumptions. Our main contribution is a new family of assumptions that can serve as a weaker generalization of DBDH.
We propose a family of progressively weaker assumptions, the k-BDH assumptions, that generalizes the DBDH assumption. The 1-BDH assumption is equivalent to DBDH. More generally, the k-BDH assumption is as follows:
given g, g
x , g y , v 1 , . . . , v k , v r 1 1 , . . . , v r k k in G, decide whether T = e(g, g)
(xy)(r 1 +···+r k ) or random in G T .
Here g and {v i } are random generators of G and x, y, and {r i } are random elements of its support Z p . We consider only the decisional versions of these problems; as with k-Linear, the computational versions are all equivalent to each other. (This is also why we refer to our assumption family as k-BDH and not k-DBDH; there is no interesting family of computational assumptions from which our decisional assumptions must be distinguished.) We remark that discovering and choosing such a family turned out to be challenging. Initially, we considered the assumption family in which the adversary, given the same input values in G, must distinguish i e g, v i xyr i from random in G T . This assumption family is easier to use than our k-BDH because the values v i and v r i i are available to pair with g x or g y , the way that in DBDH we can use the pairing to compute any of e(g, g) xy , e(g, g) xz , e(g, g) yz . However, it turns out that every member of this alternative assumption family is equivalent to DBDH. 2 The fact that the values {g r i } are not supplied in the k-BDH challenge make constructing an IBE from k-BDH more challenging.
We justify our choice by arguing both that the k-BDH assumptions are no stronger than existing (decisional) assumptions in bilinear groups and that it is plausible that they are strictly weaker. The former follows in a relatively straightforward by finding appropriate reductions. We can show that in a given group the k-BDH assumption is no stronger than DBDH and for a given k the k-BDH assumption is no stronger than the k-Linear assumption, for all values of k.
Arguing that the assumptions are weaker is more nuanced. Whether certain assumptions hold or do not hold might vary with the choice of a group and clearly if P = N P all assumptions are equally false. We give evidence that, for each k, the (k + 1)-BDH assumption is strictly weaker than the k-BDH assumption (i.e., the (k + 1)-BDH problem is strictly harder to solve than the k-BDH problem). As in previous proofs of this sort for Linear [BBS04] and k-Linear [HK07], we rely on an argument in the generic group model [Nec94, Sho97]. We show that the k + 1-BDH problem is generically hard even in the presence of an oracle that solves k-BDH.
ciphertexts are all linear in the parameter k. One can view our family as a generalization of the Boneh-Boyen selectively secure IBE system [BB04a].
Finding a system that is provably secure under the k-BDH assumption is challenging. Our system requires a novel technique that effectively switches the base of several public parameters.
The main technical difficulty arises because of the inconvenient target value in the k-BDH assumption, (e(g, g) xy k i=1 r i ). This might appear to be a natural embedding of k BDH problems: Given (g, g x , g y , g r i ) embed e(g, g) xyr i . However, we do not have the value g r i for each i (as one might hope to have in building a straightforward analogy to the Boneh-Boyen IBE). Instead, we have the pair (v i , v Looking Ahead. In the future, we expect that one will be able to build cryptosystems from our k-BDH assumption where DBDH was previously used. However, as our experience with IBE has taught us, this might require new insights or techniques.
One interesting challenge is whether one can build more complex systems using the k-BDH assumption where the performance overhead is additive in k versus a multiplicative factor (which seems more natural). For instance, in existing (Key-Policy) Attribute-Based Encryption [GPSW06, SW05] systems, the size of a private key is proportional to a policy expressed as a boolean formula. If, the cost of using the k-BDH assumption only required adding ≈ k more group elements, this could be a relatively small key size overhead for reasonably chosen k. This is in contrast to blowing up the entire key size by a factor of k. A similar argument holds for other parameters such as ciphertext size and decryption time. In one datapoint suggesting that this might be possible, Freeman et. al. [FGK + 10] recently built Lossy Trapdoor Functions in a novel way from the k-linear assumption which were rather efficient relative to the "natural" extension of the Peikert and Waters [PW08] DDH construction.
There also exist currently exist several functionalities where there are no known systems that reduce to DBDH. These include systems that appear to inherently on assumption related to source group elements such as Decision Linear. Examples of these include Groth-Sahai NIZKs [GS08] , dual system encryption proofs [Wat09] , and the Boneh-Goh-Nissim [BGN05] slightly 2-homomorphic encryption system.
Finally, an interesting question is which k values one might use in practice. For very large k, it might turn out that bit by bit encryption systems built from using hard core bits [GL89] and Computational Diffie-Hellman or Computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman have comparable efficiency. When proposing systems, it is important to keep in mind where these lines cross. However, we believe for most practical choices of k the k-BDH assumption will yield more efficient systems.
The k-BDH Assumption and Relationships
Throughout this paper we work in a cyclic group G of order p where p is a large prime. g is a generator of G. e : G × G → G T denotes an admissible bilinear map where G T is another cyclic group of order p. Bilinear Maps and well known complexity assumptions BDH, DBDH, Linear and k-Linear are formally defined in Appendix A.
. . , v k ∈ G and T ∈ G T does T = e(g, g) xy(r 1 +···+r k ) or is it the case that T = e(g, g) c . An adversary, B outputs 1 if T = e(g, g) xy(r 1 +···+r k ) and 0 otherwise. B has advantage
Where the probability is taken over the random choice of x, y, r 1 , . . . , r k , c ∈ Z * p , g, v 1 , . . . , v k ∈ G and the random bits consumed by B.
The k-BDH Assumption is that if no t-time algorithm can achieve advantage at least in deciding the k-BDH problem in G and G T . This is only a decisional problem. We show that, as a corollary of Theorem 4, the computational version is equivalent to the computational BDH problem.
k-BDH's Relationship to Standard Assumptions
In this subsection we state k-BDH's relationship to standard cryptographic assumptions; the proofs are straightforward and given in Appendix B. The reductions show that the k-BDH assumption is both secure and novel. We refer the reader to Section 4 for a discussion of the relative strengths of assumptions in the k-BDH family.
We also note that k-BDH is a member of the (R,S,T ,f )-Diffie Hellman uber-assumption family [Boy08]. Namely: R = S = {1, x, y, a 1 , . . . , a k , a 1 r 1 , . . . , a k r k }, T = {1} and f = xy(r 1 + · · · + r k ) where v i = g a i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Being part of this family tells us that it is generically secure, however, the focus on our work is to understand the relative strengths of assumptions.
k-BDH's Relationship to k-Linear
We will use the notation L k to denote the k-Linear problem. If we wish to specify the k-Linear assumption in a specific group G we write L G k , and similarly for G T .
Theorem 1. If the L G k assumption holds, then so does the k-BDH assumption.
Theorem 2. If the k-BDH assumption holds, then so does the L
From the above theorems, the natural question arises: Is k-BDH equivalent to the linear assumption in either G or G T ? Such an equivalence would imply that k-BDH assumption is neither a new assumption nor a new tool to construct a family of IBEs. Fortunately, separation of the assumptions appears to be related to inverting a bilinear map. There is strong evidence that inverting a bilinear map is hard [Ver01, Moo09]. We show separation results for these assumptions in Appendix B.3 in the generic group model.
k-BDH's Relationship to BDH
Theorem 3. If the DBDH assumption holds, then so does the k-BDH assumption.
Theorem 4. If the Computational k-BDH assumption holds, then so does the Computational BDH assumption.
Corollary 1. The Computational k-BDH assumption is equivalent to the BDH assumption.
Corollary 2. The DBDH assumption is equivalent to the 1-BDH assumption.
3 A Selectively Secure IBE system from the k-BDH Assumption For completeness, the standard definitions of IBE and the selective-ID model are given in Appendix C.
Using the k-BDH assumption in to create an IBE system is not straightforward. The main technical difficulty arises because the target in the k-BDH assumption, (e(g, g) xy k i=1 r i ), is naturally an embedding of k Computational BDH problems: Given (g, g x , g y , g r i ) find e(g, g) xyr i . However, we do not have the value g r i for each i. Instead, we have the pair (v i , v r i i ), where v i is a generator not used elsewhere. We use a cancellation trick to effectively switch the base of the v r i i . The setup algorithm will provide the values e(g x , v r i i ) and v i which are both taken to the same power in the encryption algorithm, namely y i . The challenge needs to be crafted so that it takes e(g x , g r i ) to the power y instead of taking e(g x , v r i i ) to the power y i . To do this, we provide g y in place of v y i i . Since v i = g s i for some value of s i we implicitly set y i = y/s i . Using the bilinear property of e, this effectively changes the value of the other term to e(g x , v
xr i s i y s i = e(g x , g r i ) y . The product of these values is exactly the target of the k-BDH assumption.
To ensure the challenge has the proper distribution in the view of the adversary it is required to randomize g y for every value of k.
Our IBE construction is related to the Boneh-Boyen scheme in the selective-ID model [BB04a], which is proven secure under the DBDH assumption. To prove our scheme is secure under the k-BDH assumption requires an alteration to the "Boneh-Boyen trick" for generating the private key for identities other than the target identity.
The "Boneh-Boyen trick" raises elements of the DBDH instance to cleverly selected random values to obtain a valid private key. However, constructing the same private key with the KeyGen(ID) algorithm is impossible as the random selections are unknown. Our construction uses the same idea but using multiple bases (g, v i ) requires three components instead of two for the first term of the private key.
Specifically, we use (vr
i that permits the challenge have the proper distribution. The value d is a function of the target identity and the identity associated with the private key; t i is used to randomize a public parameter; and m i randomizes the private key. The first term is dependent on both g x and v r i i from the k-BDH assumption.
The IBE system works as follows:
The values s 1 , . . . , s k ,r 1 , . . . ,r k , x (chosen uniformly and independently at random) are kept as the master-key.
Proof of Security
Theorem 5. Suppose the k-BDH assumption holds in G and G T (precisely, no t-time algorithm has advantage at least in solving the k-BDH problem in G and G T ). Then the previously defined IBE system is (t − Θ(τ kq), q, )-Selective-ID IND-CPA secure where τ is the maximum time for an exponentiation in G.
Proof. Suppose A has advantage in attacking the IBE system. We build B to solve a decisional
= e(g, g) xy(r 1 +···+r k ) ). Algorithm B works by interacting with A in a selective identity game as follows: Init: The selective identity games begins with A outputting an identity to attacked ID * .
Setup: Algorithm B first selects random a i , t i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. It then sets the public parameters to:
These parameters are are all independent of ID * in the view of A. The a i terms will serve as the way to randomize the challenge.
Phase 1: A issues queries for the private key of an identity, ID. It must be the case that ID = ID * . B's response is generated as follows for each value of 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
The second term is uniformly distributed among all elements in Z * p due to the selection of m i . Private keys can be generated for all identities except ID * .
Challenge(m 0 , m 1 ) : B picks random bit b ∈ {0, 1}. The response is:
B sets C 0 = m b T and for each i from 1 to k it sets:
We observe that (g y ) a i = v
The simulator's ability to construct the second term in this manner follows directly from the fact that the encrypted identity is ID * and no g x term appears in w 1 u ID * .
For each value of i, this implicitly sets ya i = s i y i or y i = ya i /s i . If the input is a valid k-BDH tuple then the response is drawn from a uniform distribution and m b T is the expected value:
If T is not a valid k-BDH tuple then the distribution is uniform and independent of b.
Phase 2: A issues more private key queries. It is exactly the same as Phase 1. 
Efficiency
Assume that the value e(g x , v r i i ) is precomputed for all values 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Each encryption takes k exponentiations and k group operations in G T , 2k + 1 exponentiations and k group operation in G. Decryption requires 2k bilinear map computations, one inversion and 2k + 2 group operations in G T .
Extensions
This construction fits in Boneh-Boyen framework. We give the natural extension to a hierarchical IBE in Appendix D and to a fully secure IND-CPA scheme in the style of [Wat05] in Appendix E.
Relationship between k-BDH Problems
In this section we prove that the k-BDH family of problems becomes progressively weaker. Informally, this means that an oracle for k-BDH does not help in solving a (k + 1)-BDH instance.
The proof uses the generic group model [BS84, Nec94, Sho97]. This idealized version of a group retains the important properties of the group while facilitating reasoning about its minimal possible assumptions. If a statement cannot be proven in the generic group model then it is impossible to find a group for which the statement holds. The generic group model has been used to reason about complexity assumptions both with bilinear maps [BB04b, Boy08] and without bilinear maps [Sho97].
The closely related proof for the separation of k-Linear family of assumptions [Sha07] could not be used directly. This stems from the fact that a standard multilinear map [BS03] cannot be used to solve k-BDH. We create a modified k-multilinear map that takes as input k elements in G and 1 element in G T (which is the result of a bilinear map on two elements in G) and produces an output in a third group G M (the target group of the k-multilinear map). The modified k-multilinear map acts as an oracle for k-BDH. The main technical difficulty is showing that all inputs to the k-multilinear map fail to produce a multiple of the target element in the (k + 1)-BDH instance.
Theorem 6. If the k-BDH assumption holds, then so does the (k + 1)-BDH assumption.
Proof. Informally, this means that if (k + 1)-BDH is easy, then k-BDH is also easy. Suppose we have an oracle A for (k + 1)-BDH. A can be used to solve an
k+1 , T · e(g x , g y ) r k+1 ). By returning the same value as A, the simulation is perfect.
As in the k-Linear generic group separation proof [Sha07], we prove a stronger result by means of a multilinear map [BS03, GGH12] in Theorem 7. A k multilinear map is an efficiently computable map
. . , g k ∈ G and a 1 , . . . , a k ∈ Z p ; and e k (g, . . . , g) = 1. Here, we consider a modified k-multilinear map:
Lemma 1. Given a modified k-multilinear map there is an efficient algorithm to solve k-BDH.
and no otherwise. This is correct because
and when T = e(g, g) xy k i=1 r i equality holds as required.
In the generic group model, elements of G, G T and G M are encoded as opaque strings such that only equality can be tested by the adversary. To perform operations in the group the adversary queries oracles. The oracles map the opaque string representations to elements of G, G T and G M using ξ G ,ξ T and ξ M respectively. In our case, we provide the adversary with oracles to perform Group Action in each group, Inversion in each group, Bilinear Map for
Theorem 7. Let A be an algorithm that solves (k + 1)-BDH in the generic group model making a total ofueries to the oracles computing the group action in G, G T and G M , the oracles computing inversion in G, G T and G M , the bilinear map oracle and an oracle for modified k-multilinear map. Then A's probability of success is bounded by
Proof. Consider an algorithm B that interacts with A as follows.
Let g be a randomly selected generator of G. Select random x, y, v 1 , . . . , v k+1 , r 1 , . . . , r k+1 , c ∈ Z p as well as random bit d ∈ {0, 1}. Set
) with the goal of guessing d.
B keeps track of the elements known to A as three lists:
The first element of each list is the internal representation kept by B-represented as a polynomial in the ring Z p [1, x, y, v 1 , . . . , v k+1 , r 1 , . . . , r k+1 , c]. The set of all elements in these rings are denoted F G , F T and F M . The second element is the opaque representation known to A. B handles oracle queries from A by calculating the correct value and checking to see if a the corresponding external representation already exists. If so, the corresponding known representation is returned; otherwise B generates a distinct random string to serve as the external representation and adds it to the respective list. We assume that the domains of ξ G , ξ T and ξ M are sufficiently large so that the probability that algorithm A makes queries for an element other than one obtained through B is negligible.
Oracle queries from A are handled by B as follows:
Group Action: Given elements in G with internal representations F G,i and F G,j compute F = F G,i + F G,j . If there does not already exist an external representation of the value F then generate ξ G (F ) and add (F , ξ G (F )) to L G . Return ξ G (F ). Group Action for G T and G M are handled analogously. Denote the number of Group Action queries made in G as q Gg , the number of Group Action queries made in G T as q Tg and the number of Group Action queries made in G M as q Mg .
Inversion: Given an element in G with internal representation F G,i set F = −F G,i . If there does not already exist an external representation of the value F generate ξ G (F ) and add (F , ξ G (F )) to L G . Return ξ G (F ). Inversion for G T and G M are handled analogously. Denote the number of Group Action queries made in G as q G i , the number of Group Action queries made in G T as q T i and the number of Group Action queries made in G M as q M i .
Bilinear Map (e): Given elements in G with internal representations F G,i and F G,j calculate F = F G,i · F G,j . If there does not already exist an external representation of the value F generate ξ T (F ) and add (F , ξ T (F )) to L T . Return ξ T (F ). Let q B denote the number of bilinear map queries made. 
Elements in F G have at most degree 2; elements of F T have at most degree 4; elements in F M have degree at most 2k + 4. The input elements that are in G have corresponding elements in F G with degree at most 2 and the elements in G T have corresponding elements in F T with degree at most 3. The group action and inversion operations cannot increase the degree of the polynomials in F G ,F T or F M . The Bilinear Map operation uses elements in G to produce elements of at most degree 2 + 2 = 4 in F T . The Modified Multilinear Map produces elements of at most degree 4 + k(2) in F M .
Finally, A halts and outputs a guess of d for d. B now selects random g * ∈ G and
All elements besides T b are independent of each other. Therefore the simulation engineered by B is consistent with these values unless one of the following events occur:
• Two values in F G have the same representation in G
• Two values in F T have the same representation in G T
• Two values in F M have the same representation in G M
• Using a bilinear map on values in F G , it is possible to find a multiple of e(g x , g y )
• Using a modified k-multilinear map on values in F G , it is possible to find a multiple of e(g
The input elements are all chosen independently. Since A makes q Gg + q G i group actions or inversion queries for group G the corresponding elements in F G are at most degree 2 and the probability of a collision is
p . For the elements in G T there q Tg + q T i + q B group actions or inversion or bilinear map queries are made resulting in elements in G T . Since elements in G T have corresponding polynomials in F T with degree at most 4 the probability of a collision is
p . For each of the group actions in G M , inversion in G M and k-Modified Multilinear Map queries the probability of a collision is
Next, we show the probability of finding a multiple of e(g x , g y ) k+1 i=1 r i from the terms in F G is zero. If a multiple exists, it must be formed using at least one bilinear map operation. Since x, y, r i all appear in T b then the product of at least two of these values must appear in the same element in F G for each value of i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1. This is impossible by the following claim: Claim: It is impossible for any two of x, y, r i to appear in the same monomial in F G :.
Proof. We show that each way to choose two of the three values to appear in the same term is impossible:
• x and y appear in the same term. This requires creating a multiple of the polynomial xy. We are initially given the polynomials x and y each of degree 1 (and polynomials that are independent of x and y). This means from polynomial of degree 1 we must create a polynomial of degree 2 also in F G . Only the group action and inversion oracles result in new elements in F G . However, the output of these oracles cannot increase the degree of a monomial. Thus we cannot create monomials of degree greater than 1 from x and y. In particular, xy cannot be created by the adversary.
• x and r i appear in the same term. This requires creating a multiple of xr i namely axr i . Since the term r i never appears without v i it follows that v i | a and we can rewrite axr i as a xr i v i . This is a polynomial of degree 3. It is impossible to create a polynomial of degree greater than 2 in F G . So x and r i cannot appear in the same term.
• y and r i appear in the same term. This follows from a symmetric argument that x and r i cannot appear in the same term.
Finally, we claim that it is impossible to find a multiple of e(g
In order to use the modified k-multilinear map to find a multiple of a target value,
i=1 r i , at least oneê k operation involving a multiple of T d is required. The only option is to use T d as the input element in G T . The modified k-multilinear map produces a multiple of xy
A must then use combination of oracle calls using only values in F G to form Axy k+1 i=1 r i so that it can test equality. We call the combination of oracle calls F. 3 All inputs in F G containing r i also contain v i . As a result, any monomial divisible by r i is also divisible by v i . Every type of oracle call preserves this property. In particular, consider the polynomial Axy k+1 i=1 r i constructed by the adversary in F. It is required that each monomial in the expansion of Axyr i must be divisible by v i . It follows that for each of the k + 1 values of v i it is the case that v i |A. 4 Specifically, A is divisible by k+1 i=1 v i . For a given value i, the value Axyr i is divisible by k + 4 values: x, y, v 1 , . . ., v k+1 , and r i . Producing such a term requires taking the product of at least k + 3 terms available to the adversary (x and y only appear on their own and it is impossible to produce a multiple of v i v j in F G using the group action and inversion oracles). However, the bilinear map can only take the product of 2 values and the modified k-multilinear map can only take the product from a bilinear map and k additional values for a total of k + 2. Consequently, we deduce that the adversary cannot synthesize a multiple of xy
The probability of finding a collision is bounded by
The combination of these two theorems implies: DBDH=1-BDH 2-BDH . . . k-BDH (k + 1)-BDH . . ..
Relationship Between k and the Group Size
From Theorem 7, we know that increasing k increases security. The generic attack on k-BDH appears to require O(k) discrete logarithm calculations, and that solving t discrete logarithm problems on a given curve appears to require O(t) times solving one problem; assuming that, the generic attack scales linearly with k.
Another means of increasing security is to increase the group size. An interesting question is, "what is the equivalent increase in group size if we increase k to k + 1." We assume finding the discrete log is a function, f , of the order of the group. Then in the generic attack on k-BDH where G has prime order p increasing k to k + 1 is approximately equivalent to increasing the group size from p to f −1 (
).
Conclusions and Future Work
We have proposed k-BDH, a family of assumptions generalizing the DBDH assumption. We have given evidence, using the generic group model, that assumptions in the k-BDH family become strictly weaker with increasing values of the parameter k. Unlike the k-Linear family of assumptions, k-BDH makes a natural tool for constructing pairing-based cryptosystems, including IBEs. We have demonstrated this by constructing a family of IBEs in which the kth member is secure based on k-BDH. Our IBE family fits in the Boneh-Boyen framework; we give a hierarchical IBE and a full secure variant (similar to the Waters IBE [Wat05]). Our k-BDH family allows IBEs to be instantiated with an assumption safety buffer for the first time.
We hope that, like k-Linear, our k-BDH assumption family will see widespread use. We believe that it will be especially well suited for constructing attribute-based encryption and other forms of functional encryption. In addition, we believe that dual system encryption techniques could be applied to k-BDH, yielding more efficient cryptosystems with tighter security reductions.
An important open problem arises from the fact that the k-BDH assumptions are all no weaker than computational BDH (just as the k-Linear assumptions are all no weaker than CDH). Because the components of our IBE grow with k, there may be a crossover point beyond which an IBE based on hard-core bits of the computational BDH problem is more efficient than one based on k-BDH. 
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A Complexity Assumptions
The following complexity assumptions are defined for a cyclic group G of order p where p is a large prime. g is a generator of G. Additionally, G T is a cyclic group of order p.
We say there is an admissible bilinear map e : G × G → G T between the two groups if the following conditions hold:
• Bilinear : e(g a , g b ) = e(g, g) ab holds for all a, b ∈ Z p .
• Non-degenerate: If g generate G, then e(g, g) = 1.
• Computable: e is efficiently computable on all input.
A.1 Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption
The computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem in < G, G T , e > asks given (g, g a , g b , g c ) for some a, b, c ∈ Z * p compute e(g, g) abc . An adversary, A, has advantage in solving BDH if
Where the probability is taken over the random choice of a, b, c ∈ Z * p , g ∈ G and the random bits consumed by A. The Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption is that no polynomial time algorithm can achieve non-negligible advantage in computing the BDH problem.
The decisional version of the problem (DBDH) in < G, G T , e > asks given (g, g a , g b , g c , T ) for some a, b, c, z ∈ Z * p does T = e(g, g) abc or is it the case that T = e(g, g) z . An adversary, B outputs 1 if T = e(g, g) abc and 0 otherwise. B has advantage in solving DBDH if
Where the probability is taken over the random choice of a, b, c, z ∈ Z * p , g ∈ G and the random bits consumed by B. The Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption is that no polynomial time algorithm can achieve non-negligible advantage in deciding the BDH problem.
A.2 Linear Assumption
The computational Linear problem in G asks given (g 0 , g 1 , g 2 , g
2 ) for some r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z * p compute g r 1 +r 2 0 . An adversary, A, has advantage in solving the Linear problem if
Where the probability is taken over the random choice of r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z * p , g 0 , g 1 , g 2 ∈ G and the random bits consumed by A. The Linear Assumption is that no polynomial time algorithm can achieve non-negligible advantage in computing the Linear problem.
The decisional version of the Linear problem in G asks given (g 0 , g 1 , g 2 , g
or is it the case that T = g z 0 for some z ∈ Z * p . An adversary, B, outputs 1 if T = g = 1]| ≥ 2 Where the probability is taken over the random choice of r 1 , r 2 , z ∈ Z * p , g 0 , g 1 , g 2 ∈ G and the random bits consumed by B.
The Decisional Linear Assumption is that no polynomial time algorithm can achieve non-negligible advantage in deciding the Linear problem.
The decisional k-Linear problem in G is a generalization of the Linear problem that asks given (g 0 , g 1 , . . . , g k , g
or is it the case that T = g z 0 for some z ∈ Z * p . An adversary, C, outputs 1 if T = g r 1 +···+r k 0 and 0 otherwise. The Decisional k-Linear Assumption is that no polynomial time algorithm can achieve non-negligible advantage in deciding the k-Linear problem.
Shacham [Sha07] proved that the family of Decisional k-Linear Assumptions becomes weaker as k increases at least in the generic group model. However, in the computational version of the problem the complexity is the same for all members of the family. In particular Computational Diffie-Hellman=L k (for k ≥ 1).
B Proofs of k-BDH's Relationship to Standard Assumptions B.1 k-BDH's Relationship to k-Linear
We will use the notation L k to denote the k-Linear problem. If we wish to specify the k-Linear assumption in a specific group G we write L G k .
Proof. Suppose we have an adversary A that can decide k-BDH. We can construct A that solves the
k , e(g, T ) y ). By returning the same value as A, the simulation is perfect. Proof. Suppose we have an adversary A that can decide Decisional k-Linear in G T . We can construct A that solves the k-BDH problem. On input (g,
= e(g, g) xy(r 1 +···+r k ) ), A runs A on input (e(g x , g y ), e(g, v 1 ), . . . , e(g, v k ), e(g, v r 1 1 ), . . . , e(g, v r k k ), T ). By returning the same value as A, the simulation is perfect.
B.2 k-BDH's Relationship to BDH
Proof. Suppose we have an adversary A that can decide k-BDH. We can construct A that solves the DBDH problem. On input (g, g a , g b , g c , T ? = e(g, g) abc ), A selects random r 1 , . . . , r k , x 2 , . . . , x k ∈ Z * p and runs A on input (g, g a , g b , g r 1 , . . ., g r k , g cr 1 , g x 2 r 2 , . . ., g x k r k , T · e(g a , g b ) x 2 +···+x k ). By returning the same value as A, the simulation is perfect. Proof. Suppose we have an adversary A that can decide Computational BDH. We can construct A that solves the computational k-BDH problem. A is given input (g, g x , g y , v 1 , . . . , v k , v Proof. We prove in Theorem 3 if the DBDH assumption holds, then so does k-BDH. The reduction also holds for the computational versions of the problems: there is no target in the input to either A or A and the results are elements in G T instead of a bit. A generates the same random values and gives the same inputs (other than the target) to A. A's result is divided by e(g a , g b ) x 2 +···+x k to obtain e(g, g) abc . Combining the result of Theorem 4 we have Computational k-BDH = BDH.
Corollary 2. The DBDH assumption is equivalent to the 1-BDH assumption. 1 ) then 1-BDH is equivalent to DBDH. We showed in Theorem 3 that if the DBDH assumption holds, then so does k-BDH for all values of k. It remains to show that if the 1-BDH assumption holds then so does DBDH. We modify the arguments in Theorem 4 so that the k-BDH instance has an additional input T and the query to the adversary is (v 1 , v r 1 1 , g x , g y , T ).
B.3 Separation Results for k-BDH and k-Linear
We prove the k-BDH assumption is equivalent to neither
To prove that these assumptions are distinct we show,
in the generic group model making a total ofueries to the oracles computing the group action in G and G T , the oracles computing inversion in G and G T , the bilinear map oracle and an oracle for k-BDH. Then A's probability of success is bounded by
In the generic group model, elements of G and G T are encoded as opaque strings such that only equality can be tested by the adversary. To perform operations in the group the adversary queries oracles. The oracles map the opaque string representations to elements of G and G T using ξ G and ξ T respectively. In our case, we provide the adversary with oracles to perform Group Action in
Consider an algorithm B that interacts with A as follows.
Let g be a randomly selected generator of G. Select random z, v 1 , . . . , v k , r 1 , . . . , r k , c ∈ Z p as well as random bit d ∈ 0, 1. Set
B keeps track of the elements known to A as two lists:
The first element of each list is the internal representation kept by B-represented as a polynomial in the ring Z p [1, z, v 1 , . . . , v k+1 , r 1 , . . . , r k , c] . The set of all elements in these rings are denoted F G and F T . The second element is the opaque representation known to A. B handles oracle queries from A by calculating the correct value and checking to see if a the corresponding external representation already exists. If so, the corresponding known representation is returned; otherwise B generates a distinct random string to serve as the external representation and adds it to the respective list. We assume that the domains of ξ G and ξ T are sufficiently large so that the probability that algorithm A makes queries for an element other than one obtained through B is negligible.
Group Action: Given elements in G with internal representations F G,i and F G,j compute F = F G,i + F G,j . Generate ξ G (F ) and add (F , ξ G (F ) ) to L G if there does not already exist an external representation of the value. Return ξ G (F ). Group Action for G T is handled analogously. Denote the number of Group Action queries made in G as q Gg and the number of Group Action queries made in G T as q Tg .
Inversion: Given an element in G with internal representation 
. This is computable because F G,vi |X for all values of i. If the equality holds then return 1; otherwise return 0. Let q K be the number of k-BDH queries made.
Elements in F G have at most degree 0; elements of F T have at most degree 2. There is one input element in G, g, which is represented internally as the polynomial 1 which has degree 0. The input elements in G T have corresponding polynomials with degree at most 2. The group action and inversion operations do not increase the degree of the polynomials in either F G or F T . The Bilinear Map operation takes as input elements in G to produce polynomials of at most degree 0 + 0 = 0 in F T .
The k-BDH Query produces internally elements of at most degree 2. The values in F G are of degree 0, so any number of additions and multiplications also results in a degree 0 polynomial. Therefore the degree of left hand side of the equation comes solely from the F T,j element. Notice that this means the k-BDH query can only return 1 when the degrees of the left hand side and right hand side are the same. This implies the adversary is unable to gain any information about the target (or any term in F T ) from the k-BDH Query, since the target has degree greater than zero and the right hand side has degree 0.
All elements besides T b are independent of each other. Therefore the simulation engineered by B is consistent with these values unless one of the following five things happen:
• Two values in G are not chosen independently
• Two values in G T are not chosen independently
• The k-BDH Query returns 0 because the polynomial representation of the inputs do not satisfy the test conditions. However, for the actual integer inputs the test condition holds.
• It is possible to find a multiple of e(g, g) z k i=1 r i from the other terms in the polynomial.
• It is possible to learn information about e(g, g)
There is only one value in G revealed to A, so the probability of finding 2 dependent variables is 0. There q Tg +q T i +q B group actions or inversion or bilinear map queries are made resulting in polynomials in F T . Since the polynomials corresponding to elements in G T have at most degree 2 the probability of a collision is
p . For each of the k queries the probability of selecting two polynomials with the same value is 2 p for a total probability of q k 2 2 p . It remains to show the probability of finding a multiple of e(g, g) z k i=1 r i from the other terms in the polynomial. This has an internal representation of a polynomial with degree 2. It cannot be crafted T b , otherwise it would be dependent on T b . All other polynomials have at most degree 2 from the G T representation. All operations involving the polynomial 1 (g's representation in F G ) result in a polynomial of the same degree in both F G and F T . Therefore it is impossible to create a polynomial of degree 2 from the other terms.
Combining this result and Theorem 2, we have, in a generic group, k-BDH L
To prove that these assumptions are distinct we show:
Theorem 9. In a generic group, L G k is not equivalent to k-BDH.
Proof. Let A be an algorithm that solves k-BDH in the generic group model making a total ofueries to the oracles computing the group action in G and G T , the oracles computing inversion in G and G T , the bilinear map oracle and an oracle for L G k . Then A's probability of success is bounded by
Let g be a randomly selected generator of G . Select random x, y, v 1 , . . . , v k , r 1 , . . . , r k , c ∈ Z p as well as random bit d ∈ 0, 1. Set v 1 ) , . . . , ξ G ( with the goal of guessing d.
The first element of each list is the internal representation kept by B-represented as a polynomial in the ring Z p [1, x, y, v 1 , . . . , v k , r 1 , . . . , r k , c] . The set of all elements in these rings are denoted F G and F T . The second element is the opaque representation known to A. B handles oracle queries from A by calculating the correct value and checking to see if a the corresponding external representation already exists. If so, the corresponding known representation is returned; otherwise B generates a distinct random string to serve as the external representation and adds it to the respective list. We assume that the domains of ξ G and ξ T are sufficiently large so that the probability that algorithm A makes queries for an element other than one obtained through B is negligible.
Group Action: Given elements in G with internal representations F G,i and F G,j compute F = F G,i + F G,j . If there does not already exist an external representation of the value F then generate ξ G (F ) and add (F , ξ G (F )) to L G . Return ξ G (F ). Group Action for G T is handled analogously. Denote the number of Group Action queries made in G as q Gg and the number of Group Action queries made in G T as q Tg .
Inversion: Given an element in G with internal representation F G,i set F = −F G,i . If there does not already exist an external representation of the value F generate ξ G (F ) and add (F , ξ G (F )) to L G . Return ξ G (F ). Inversion for G T is handled analogously. Denote the number of Group Action queries made in G as q G i and the number of Group Action queries made in G T as q T i .
Bilinear Map: Given elements in G with internal representations F G,i and F G,j calculate F = F G,i · F G,j . If there does not already exist an external representation of the value F generate ξ T (F ) and add (F , ξ T (F )) to L T . Return ξ T (F ). Let q B denote the number of bilinear map queries made.
. This is computable because F G,vi |X for all values of i. If the equality holds then return 1; otherwise return 0. Let q K be the number of L G k queries made.
Elements in F G have at most degree 2; elements of F T have at most degree 4. The input elements that are in G have corresponding elements in F G with degree at most 2 and the elements in G T have corresponding elements in F T with degree at most 3. The group action and inversion operations do not increase the degree of the polynomials in either F G or F T . The Bilinear Map operation uses elements in G to produce elements of at most degree 2 + 2 = 4 in F T ; this is the only oracle query that produces an external representation of an element with a larger degree than the input.
The L G k oracle outputs a boolean value. However, the internal representation can be a large as 2k. Each side of the test equation will have degree at most 2k. The terms F G,x , F G,ri , F G,Q all have at most degree 2. If all F G,vi terms have degree 2 then X has degree 2k and
Consequently, XF G,Q has at most degree 2k and
has degree at most 2 + 2k − 2 = 2k.
Finally, A halts and outputs a guess of d for d. B now selects random g * ∈ G and x * , y * ,
• It is possible to find a multiple of e(g x , g y ) k i=1 r i from the other terms in the polynomial.
• It is possible to learn information about e(g x , g y )
The elements in G are all chosen independently. Since A makes q Gg + q G i group actions or inversion queries for group G the corresponding elements in F G are at most degree 2 and the probability of a collision is
p . For each of the K G k queries the probability of selecting two polynomials with the same value is 2k p for a total probability of
The L G k cannot ever answer true for a question about the target since none of the inputs to L G k are in the target group.
The probability of finding a collision is bounded by:
The combination of this result and Theorem 1 is
C Definitions
In this section we provide the standard definitions and security models for IBE. The definition for adaptive security was given by Boneh and Franklin [BF03] ; the definition for selective-ID security was first given by Canetti, Halevi, and Katz [CHK03] .
C.1 Identity Based Encryption
Definition 2. Identity Based Encryption consists of the following algorithms:
• Setup produces the public system parameters and the private master-key.
• KeyGen(ID) uses the master-key to create a private key for an identity.
• Encrypt(m, ID) uses the system parameters to encrypt a message m for an identity ID. A message can be encrypted for a user with identity ID even if a private key does not yet exist for the identity.
• Decrypt(c, ID) uses the private key belonging to ID to decrypt the ciphertext.
C.2 Chosen Plaintext Security for Identity-Based Encryption
CPA security for IBE is defined using the following game:
Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm to generate the public parameters which are given to the adversary. It also generates the master-key which is kept secret.
Phase 1: The adversary issues at most poly(k) KeyGen queries to obtain the private key corresponding to the identities ID 1 , . . . , ID poly(k) . The queries may be adaptive.
Challenge:
The adversary selects an identity ID * and two messages M 0 and M 1 on which it wishes to challenge. The challenger selects a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and responds with Encrypt(M b , ID * ). The only restriction is that ID i = ID * for 1 ≤ i ≤ poly(k).
Phase 2: This phase is the same as Phase 1 except a private key will not be generated when the queried identity is ID * . 
Guess

C.3 Selective Identity CPA Security for Identity Based Encryption
In this model of IBE, there is an additional stage(Init) which occurs before the Setup algorithm. In this stage the adversary selects ID * the identity to be challenged. Consequently, the public parameters may depend on ID * .
C.4 Chosen Ciphertext Security for Identity-Based Encryption
The CCA-Security game allows, during Phase 1 and Phase 2, for decryption queries of ciphertext encrypted for ID * . There is a restriction that the ciphertext is not equal to the challenge ciphertext in Phase 2. There are general methods [BCHK07, BMW05] of converting a CPA-Secure IBE into a CCA-Secure scheme. 
The values s 1 , . . . , s k , r 1 , . . . , r k , x are kept as the master-key.
Note that the private key for ID can be generated from the parent identity (ID 1 , . . . , ID L −1 ). Suppose the parent's private key was (K A,1 , . . . , K A,k , K B,1,1 , . . . , K B,k,L −1 ). For each value of 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the parent select random n i,L , updates
The HIBE extension allows us to use standard transformations [BCHK07, BMW05] to construct a Selective-ID CCA-Secure L-level HIBE from a Selective-ID CPA-Secure (L + 1)-level HIBE.
Theorem 10. Suppose the k-BDH assumption holds in G and G T (precisely, no t-time algorithm has advantage at least in solving the k-BDH problem in G and G T ). Then the previously defined HIBE system is (t − Θ(τ Lkq), q, )-Selective-ID IND-CPA secure where τ is the maximum time for an exponentiation in G.
Proof. Suppose A has advantage in attacking the HIBE system. We build B to solve a decisional
= e(g, g) xy(r 1 +···+r k ) ). Algorithm B works by interacting with A in a selective identity game as follows: Init: The selective identity games begins with A outputting an identity to attacked
Setup: Algorithm B first selects random a i , t i,j , and
It then sets the public parameters to:
. These parameters are are all independent of ID * in the view of A. The a i terms will serve as the way to randomize the challenge.
Phase 1: A issues queries for the private key of an identity, ID = (ID 1 , . . . , ID u ) for u ≤ L. It must be the case that ID is not a prefix of ID * .
Let l be the smallest index value such that 
For each value of i, this implicitly sets ya i = s i y i or y i = ya i /s i . If T is a valid k-BDH tuple then the response is drawn from a uniform distribution and m b T is the expected value. If T is not a valid k-BDH tuple then the distribution is uniform and independent of b.
Phase 2: A issues more private key queries. It is exactly the same as Phase1. E Fully CPA-Secure IBE Under the k-BDH Assumption
Here we apply a transformation to the selective-ID scheme to obtain a scheme that is fully secure. It is similar to the transformation Waters applied to the [BB04a] scheme in [Wat05]. Besides growing with respect to k, this transformation is slightly more complex than Waters' because the base of the parameters may be g or v i . In this construction, identities are represented as bit strings of length l, a separate security parameter unrelated to p. This bit string is denoted ID and the j th bit of the string is ID j . Alternatively, using a collision resistant hash function, H({0, 1} * ) → {0, 1} l , identities can be arbitrarily lengths. We define V ⊆ {1, . . . , l} to be the set of all j for which ID j = 1.
Setup : The public parameters are (g,
We chose to prove security using the artificial abort method, and our proof uses the same arguments as [Wat05, HW10]. The only deviation is in the selection of w i and u i,j ; which are set to (g x ) p−4qc+α v
respectively for random values c, α , β i , α j , β i,j where q is the maximum number of queries made by the adversary.
Theorem 11. Suppose the k-BDH assumption holds in G and G T . Then the fully CPA-Secure IBE system is IND-CPA secure.
Proof. Suppose A has advantage in attacking the IBE system after making at mostueries. We build a simulator B to solve a decisional k-BDH instance (g, g x , g y , v 1 , . . . , v k , v r 1 1 , . . . , v r k k , T ). The output is a bit γ where 1 corresponds to a properly formed k-BDH tuple. If A submits q KeyGen queries and succeeds with probability 1 2 + , then B breaks the k-BDH assumption with probability
where l is the bit length of the identity input. Simulator B works by interacting with A in a selective identity game as follows:
Setup: Random Choices: B first selects random a i ∈ Z p for 1 ≤ i ≤ k; this will serve as a way to randomize the challenge. It also chooses integer c uniformly at random from 0 to l, α an integer chosen uniformly at random from Z 4q , and an l-length vector − → α = {α j } in which the elements are chosen randomly in Z 4q . Additionally, for each value 1 ≤ i ≤ k β i and an l-length vector − → β i = {β i,j } are chosen randomly from Z p .
Functions: For ease of analysis, the following functions are defined:
Public Parameters: It then sets the public parameters to: (g, g x , v i , vr
). These parameters have the correct distribution in the view of A; the β terms randomize w i and u i,j Phase 1: A issues queries for the private key of an identity, ID. First K(ID) is evaluated. If the result is 0 then a random guess of γ ∈ {0, 1} is chosen and B aborts. Otherwise, B's response is generated as follows for each value of 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
The second term is uniformly distributed among all elements in Z p due to the selection of m i . If K(ID) = 0 this implies F (ID) = 0 mod p since p should be chosen such that p > 4qc.
Challenge(ID * , m 0 , m 1 ) : The simulator checks if F (ID * ) ≡ 0 mod p. If not, it aborts after picking a random value of γ ∈ {0, 1}. Otherwise B proceeds by picking random bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Output to A, the response:
For each value of i, this implicitly sets ya i = s i y i or y i = ya i /s i . The (w i u i,j ) y i terms are correct. The expected value is
Since F (ID * ) ≡ 0 mod p the terms involving α and α j sum to 0 mod p and we are left with (v
If T is a valid k-BDH tuple then the first value of the response is drawn from a uniform distribution and m b T is the expected value:
Phase 2: A issues more private key queries. It is the same as Phase1 except it will not answer queries for ID * .
We prove if A wins Game 1 with probability 1 2 + , then it succeeds in winning Game 3 with probability Proof. As in [Wat05, HW10] we want to find a lower bound on the probability of the simulation not triggering a regular abort. The proof is repeated here for completeness.
Without loss of generality, assume the adversary always makes the maximum number of queries q as the probability of not aborting increases with fewer queries. Fix an arbitrary − → Q =(Q 1 , . . ., Q q , Q * ) ∈ Z{0, 1} l . Then with the probability over the choice of − → Q , c we have that Pr[abort on from the simulator guessing the value of c. Equation (6) is derived by applying Bayes' Theorem. Equation (9) follows from the pairwise independence of the probabilities K(Q) = 0,K(Q) = 0 for any pair of queries Q =Q, since they will differ in at least one random ID j value. Equation (12) is the result of applying m = 4q.
In the following claims we use Chernoff bounds to find an upper and lower bounds on the probability of any abort (regular or artificial). These bounds will be used in evaluating the adversary's success in Game 2.
Claim 2. For any set of queries − → Q , the probability that there is an abort (regular or artificial) is ≥ 1 − ζ min − Recall that for a measured ζ Q an artificial abort will not happen with probability Recall that for a measured ζ Q an artificial abort will not happen with probability Analyzing A's probability of success in the Games. We now complete the proof by analyzing the probability A can distinguish between the games. We denotes A's probability of success in Game 
Equation (14) follows from the fact that, in the case of abort A's success is determined by a coin flip. It would be very convenient if we could claim Adv A [Game 2|abort] = Adv A [Game 1], but unfortunately this is false. The event that A wins Game 2 and the event of an abort are not independent; however, we have inserted the balancing abort condition in the attempt to lessen the dependence between these events. Equation (15) simply states that, when there is no abort, A wins if and only if it guess correctly. Equation (16) follows from Bayes' Theorem. In (17) we observe Pr[b = b ] is exactly A's success in Game 1. The purpose of the artificial abort is to even the probability of aborting, for all queries made by A, to be roughly ζ min . This will also get rid of the conditional dependence on b = b . There will be a small error which must be taken into account. Proof. We make the explicit observation that these games are equivalent by observing that their only difference is the time at which the regular abort occurs. The artificial abort stage is identical. All public parameters, evaluations and proofs have the same distribution up to the point of a possible abortion. In Game 2, the simulator receives all queries − → Q , then checks τ ( − → Q ) = 1 (with the public parameters) and aborts taking a random guess, if so. In Game 3 the simulator checks with each new query Q if K(Q) = 0, which implies that the ending τ will be 1, and aborts, taking a random guess if so. Therefore, the output distributions will be the same.
